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Overview 
• There is an enormous amount of change going on in energy systems (technology (supply, 
demand and operation); economics; social preferences; environmental understanding, 
business models etc) which is leading to uncertainty 
• Given this situation, energy policy decision-makers, when encouraging innovation:  
– have to make the ‘right’ decisions, then 
– be constantly vigilant about unforeseen consequences, and then 
– be prepared to ‘re-set’ the policy to get it back on track 
– this requires a clear Vision and Direction 
• This is designing governance (policies, institutions, market and network rules and incentives) to encourage a 
sustainable future, and then letting markets work within that framework 
• This paper is focused on energy system ‘disruption’ from a Government decision-makers 
point of view 
– It argues that the GB energy system is likely to suffer serious disruption in the near to 
mid term unless GB restructures its governance system to be fit for purpose to enable 
innovation rather than stifle it, as is the current situation  
• The paper 
– Sets out general challenges facing energy system transformation 
– Sets out the additional, specific challenges faced by GB 
– Sets out principles of institutional reform 
– Sets out the solutions for the GB problems: the IGov framework 
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General challenges of transforming energy 
systems    
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Specific GB problems to solve 
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Principles of Institutional Reform    
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General Challenges Specific GB Problems to Solve Institutional Solutions  
Change in system occurring in an unco-ordinated way with no meaningful control of direction, 
and with unforeseen outcomes which often have dysfunctional responses 
IGov Framework 
CCC provides advice on science and GHG budgets but no ability to recommend policy (and 
infrastructural) responses to meet GHG reductions 
CCC budgets linked to IISO outputs  
DECC / BEIS meant to take high level policy decisions, and then pass them on to other bodies for 
execution. Q on whether they have sufficient expert capacity. 
Political nature of energy recognised, BEIS takes decisions, 
IISO directed to meet CCC targets, Ofgem economic 
regulates only 
Ofgem was set up as an economic regulator which now has environmental and social 
responsibilities added – de facto making policy trade-offs which major distributional impacts and 
a significant amount of de facto decision making in electricity operation to National Grid, despite 
conflicts of interest 
BEIS takes decisions, with advice from CCC and Consensus 
Building Body, whilst IISO responsible for security and 
infrastructure to enable meeting the CCC budgets 
System operation focuses on transmission rather than on T & D, and with insufficient integration 
across electricity, heat and transport 
Integrated and Independent System Operator, on same 
level of hierarchy as economic regulator and working 
directly to BEIS and delivering a SO which can meet CCC 
budgets 
Self-regulation of industry codes leads to inertia, complexity, de facto policy and opaqueness Code body,  without self-regulation, working to IISO 
Access to data is poor, and will get worse with more ICT, means that it is difficult to know the 
value of new services 
Data Body for free, accessible data + market monitor 
Altering value /payments to encourage a 
sustainable energy system 
Much of change relates to the demand side, at the local level with new services yet no local 
markets; and the payment of value for system services, storage and DSR is minimal 
Distribution Service Providers, IISO, local markets 
 
Investment has to be attracted and 
infrastructure paid for 
Chopping and changing of policies and inflexible regulatory system Consensus Building Body, Data Body, Market Monitor, 
greater use of outputs based regulation, IISO leading to 
greater co-ordination, transparency, legitimacy 
Customer bills have to be kept low and their 
wishes met 
Customers seen in traditional sectoral distinctions as opposed to their engagement to system Customer-focused energy system, distribution service 
provider which assigns values to services, including 
(potentially) those from customers 
Insufficient Consensus Building No obvious place for transparent discussion and reaching of consensus Consensus Building Body 
Needs to be legitimate, equitable, and 
transparent 
Multiple bodies for EP execution which de facto undertake policy making, lack of co-ordination, 
lack of consensus building,  is undermining of transparency and legitimacy of EP and leading to 
lack of trust 
IGov Framework 
Needs nimble governance to keep up with 
changes in technology and operation, social 
preferences 
Large, bureaucratic and slow Ofgem which  is ill-suited to rapidly changing energy system  Ofgem pared back to being an economic regulator 
FYI – Too Small to Read - Matching Challenges and Problems 
to Solve to Institutional Solutions of IGov Framework 
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Matching Principles to Institutional 
Reform within the IGov Framework 
Principles of Institutional Reform Institutional Reform 
Energy System Centred on Customers DSPs, local energy markets, bottom-up 
optimisation via DSPs and IISO 
Facilitating Local Energy Markets DSPs 
Open and Transparent Access to Data Data Body, Market Monitor 
Greater Co-ordination Consensus Building Body, IISO to enable 
the meeting of CCC budget, BEIS taking 
decisions,  Ofgem as economic regulator 
only does economic regulation 
Long-term Political Stability Consensus Building Body 
Transparent and Legitimate Policy-making Greater coherence of decision-making; 
less delegation from BEIS to other bodies 
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New institutional Framework? 
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Fit for Purpose IGov Framework  
